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1 
Towards a Control-Centric Account of Tort Liability 
for Automated Vehicles 




Existing motor vehicle accident laws are generally described as ‘driver-centric’, 
since regulatory, liability, and insurance obligations revolve around drivers. This 
is sometimes taken to imply that they cannot apply to automated vehicles. This 
article seeks to re-centre the liability discussion around the tortious doctrine of 
control. It argues centrally that properly understanding legal control as influence 
over metaphysical risks, rather than physical objects, clarifies that automated 
vehicles are both legally controllable in theory, despite having no human drivers, 
and legally controlled in practice, despite their reliance on machine learning. 
Examining today’s automated driving technology and businesses, this article 
demonstrates how manufacturers, software developers, fleet operators, and 
consumers participate in vehicular risk creation. Finally, how control could 
illuminate courts’ analyses of automated vehicle liability is illustrated by a 
hypothetical application to recent automated vehicle accidents. In this light, 
this article concludes that existing tort principles are better-equipped to resolve 
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A 2016 discussion paper by the National Transport Commission (‘NTC’) noted 
that present common law frameworks for motor vehicle accident (‘MVA’) liability 
are ‘sufficiently dynamic and robust to adapt to the challenges that [automated 
vehicles] will present’,1 particularly if  ‘government and industry can clarify the 
meaning of driver and control’.2 The NTC subsequently clarified that the legal 
entity which certifies the vehicle’s automated driving system (‘ADS’, and the 
entity an ‘ADSE’) shall be deemed to ‘control’ an automated vehicle (‘AV’)3 when 
the ADS is engaged.4 Insofar as liability follows control, liability for ADS-driven 
vehicles is thus implicitly assigned to ADSEs (who are likely to be ADS 
manufacturers) without substantially revising the existing liability regime. 
This approach stands in apparent contrast to a growing body of academic 
literature5 arguing that existing regimes are ill-equipped for AVs and in need of 
                                                 
1 National Transport Commission (‘NTC’), Regulatory Reforms for Automated Road Vehicles 
(Policy Paper, November 2016) 61, quoting a submission by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers. 
2 Ibid 60 (emphasis in original). The paper also examines ‘control’ and ‘driving’ in ss 3 and 4 
respectively. 
3 AVs are also referred to as autonomous, driverless, or self-driving vehicles. This article prefers 
‘automated’, in keeping with the NTC’s terminology, but makes no distinction between these 
terms. 
4 NTC, Automated Vehicle Program (Approach Paper, October 2019) 11 (‘NTC Approach Paper’). 
5 See, eg, Maurice Schellekens, ‘Self-Driving Cars and the Chilling Effect of Liability Law’ (2015) 
31(4) Computer Law and Security Review 506; John W Zipp, ‘The Road Will Never Be the Same: 
A Reexamination of Tort Liability for Autonomous Vehicles’ (2016) 43(2) Transportation Law 
Journal 137; KC Webb, ‘Products Liability and Autonomous Vehicles: Who’s Driving Whom?’ 
(2017) 23(4) Richmond Journal of Law and Technology 9; Bryant Walker Smith, ‘Automated 
Driving and Product Liability’ [2017] (1) Michigan State Law Review 1; Jan De Bruyne and Jarich 
Werbrouck, ‘Merging Self-Driving Cars with the Law’ (2018) 34(5) Computer Law and Security 
Review 1150; Maurice Schellekens, ‘No-Fault Compensation Schemes for Self-Driving Vehicles’ 
(2018) 10(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 314; Kenneth S Abraham and Robert L Rabin, 
‘Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a 
New Era’ (2019) 105(1) Virginia Law Review 127; Steven Shavell, ‘On the Redesign of Accident 
Liability for the World of Autonomous Vehicles’ (Discussion Paper No 1014, Harvard Law School, 
August 2019) (‘Redesign Accident Liability’). 
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substantial reform. 6  Proposed alternatives include manufacturer enterprise 
liability and strict liability to the state.7 Such divergence is surprising because, 
like the NTC, most commentators trace the problem with existing law to ‘driver-
centricity’: the assumption that all vehicle have human drivers around which 
accident liability, as well as insurance obligations, are conventionally centred.8 
This article seeks to explain and reconcile this tension by analysing the doctrine 
of control from a tort law (as opposed to the NTC’s regulatory) perspective. The 
central argument is that properly framing existing MVA tort liability laws as 
control-centric, rather than driver-centric, clarifies that existing doctrine 
surrounding legal control can apply to AVs. It further examines the current state 
of AV technology and business models to highlight the (underexplored) extent of 
legal control traceable to AV manufacturers, developers, operators, and users. 
Referring to recent AV-related accidents, it then demonstrates how control 
analysis could illuminate the courts’ analysis of AV negligence liability in practical 
cases.   
Part II sets the scene by outlining existing MVA liability frameworks and how 
they might be seen as ‘driver-centric’. It unpacks driver-centricity into two layers 
at the liability and insurance levels respectively. Next, tracing the historical 
development of MVA liability, it shows that the doctrine of control, rather than 
vague notions of ‘driverness’, has always been the legal principle relied on for MVA 
liability. 
Part III examines control as a tortious doctrine. It distinguishes between 
engineering and lay senses of ‘control’ on the one hand and control as used and 
understood by tort law courts on the other. Just as an employer need not actively 
                                                 
6 Tom Mackie, ‘Proving Liability for Highly and Fully Automated Vehicle Accidents in Australia’ 
(2018) 34(6) Computer Law and Security Review 1314, 1316. 
7 See generally NTC Approach Paper (n 5). 
8 For academic references to ‘driver-centricity’ see below n 26. For the NTC’s view see NTC 
Approach Paper (n 4) 4; NTC, Changing Driving Laws to Support Automated Vehicles (Policy 




dictate all of an employee’s physical actions to ‘control’ the employee for vicarious 
liability purposes, tortious control does not require active determination of a 
vehicle’s speed and direction. The crux, rather, is that one determines the 
metaphysical risks of harm an AV poses. This clarifies that control remains a 
workable principle for analysing AV liability even when no human is driving an 
AV. 
Part IV applies the above towards examining who legally controls an AV. It first 
details how AV technologies and business models operate, focusing on the extent 
of human input in risk creation. It then demonstrates how legal control may be 
traced to vehicle manufacturers, software developers, AV operators, and 
consumers. While control of conventional vehicles was indeed driver-centred, 
control of AVs is distributed across the supply chain. The legal implications of this 
are briefly considered. 
Finally, Part V further grounds the analysis by hypothetically considering how 
control could illuminate the courts’ consideration of individual elements in 
negligence. This analysis is conducted vis-à-vis early examples of AV litigation 
from the US, four of which are outlined in Part V. 
Before proceeding, it should be clarified that this article’s control-centric thesis is 
targeted narrowly at fault-based liability regimes. This has three implications for 
its scope. First, the thesis has admittedly limited relevance to no-fault liability 
regimes adopted, for instance, in New Zealand and a growing number of Australian 
states and territories.9 Nonetheless, given that many jurisdictions within and 
beyond Australia remain under fault-based regimes, and further that a number of 
no-fault regimes provide residual rights for tortious claims, clarifying how tort law 
may allocate AV liability remains important. Indeed, this may help policymakers 
gauge how the need to provide for AV accidents affects the longstanding debate 
                                                 
9 See Part II(A) below for a jurisdictional survey of liability regimes. 
Note: A final version of this pre-print is to be published in the Torts Law Journal 
 
5 
between fault and no-fault regimes. 10  Second, while the article’s doctrinal 
discussion refers primarily from Australian tort law, the thesis applies to other 
fault-based common law jurisdictions to the extent that their tort doctrines are 
similar. Thus, reference will be made to the position in comparable jurisdictions 
where appropriate. Third, the article will not comprehensively engage with 
(important) issues surrounding AV regulation such as testing frameworks, quality 
assurance, insurance regimes, and traffic rules.11 
II From Driver-Centricity to Control-Centricity 
A Existing Liability Regimes 
Though common, driving remains particularly hazardous. 12  AV literature 
routinely emphasises how human drivers cause thousands of fatalities and millions 
in economic loss yearly.13 MVA liability standards thus differ internationally, 
ranging from strict liability, typically imposed on hazardous and uncommon 
activities, 14  to negligence, and no-fault liability. The Australian states and 
territories varyingly adopt (negligence) fault-based regimes, hybrid regimes (which 
are primarily no-fault but provide residual rights to common law claims),15 and 
                                                 
10 For historical context on the debate in Australia see Mark R Forwood, ‘Whither No-Fault 
Schemes in Australia: Have We Closed the Care and Compensation Gap?’ (2018) 43(3) Alternative 
Law Journal 166. 
11 For regulation-focused view see Henry Prakken, ‘On the Problem of Making Autonomous 
Vehicles Conform to Traffic Law’ (2017) 25(3) Artificial Intelligence and Law 341.  
12 Gregory H Shill, ‘Should Law Subsidize Driving?’ (2020) 95(2) New York University Law Review 
498, 573. 
13 Mark Brady, ‘Is Australian Law Adaptable to Automated Vehicles?’ (2019) 6(3) Griffith Journal 
of Law and Human Dignity 35, 35; Mark A Geistfeld, ‘A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State 
Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation’ (2017) 105(6) California 
Law Review 1611, 1614; Abraham and Rabin (n 5). 
14 See Steven Shavell, ‘The Mistaken Restriction of Strict Liability to Uncommon Activities’ (2018) 
10 Journal of Legal Analysis 1. 
15 Eg, Victoria’s compensation regime is primarily a no-fault insurance scheme administered by 
the Transport Accident Commission, but claimants with serious injuries may still file common law 




pure no-fault regimes (which do not).16 This is supplemented by the no-fault 
National Injury Insurance Scheme (‘NIIS’) which covers ‘catastrophic’ injuries 
countrywide.17 
The rest of the world is similarly diverse. As with Australia, the United States 
exhaust the spectrum from fault to no-fault systems; some have notably reverted 
from the latter to former.18 MVA liability in the UK, Singapore, and Hong Kong 
remain premised on negligence,19 though recent UK legislation establishes strict 
                                                 
<www.tac.vic.gov.au/clients/how-we-can-help/treatments-and-services/policies/other/lump-sum-
damages-common-law>.  
16 The NTC’s 2018 discussion paper lists Western Australia, South Australia, the Australian 
Capital Territory and Queensland as fault-based, Victoria, Tasmania and New South Wales as 
hybrids, and the North Territory as a pure no-fault system. See NTC, Motor Accident Injury 
Insurance and Automated Vehicles (Discussion Paper, October 2018) 15–16. There have been 
changes since then, however, with the ACT switching in February 2020 to a hybrid system: Katie 
Burgess, ‘New CTP Bill Passes but Savings Eroded’, The Canberra Times (online, 17 May 2019) 
<www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6128524/new-ctp-bill-passes-but-savings-eroded/>. Debate 
also exists in Queensland on a possible shift to no-fault: Mina Martin, ‘Suncorp Pushes for No-
Fault CTP Scheme’, Insurance Business Australia (online, 18 March 2020) 
<www.insurancebusinessmag.com/au/news/breaking-news/suncorp-pushes-for-nofault-ctp-
scheme-217103.aspx>; Greg Black, ‘The Reasons Why the Proposed Changes to the Queensland 
Compulsory Third Party Scheme Is a Terrible Idea’, Compensation Law Experts (Blog Post, 14 
April 2020) <https://vbrlaw.com.au/proposed-changes-qld-ctp-scheme-terrible-idea/>. 
17 For a review of Australian compulsory third-party insurance and the NIIS schemes see Mark 
Brady et al, ‘Automated Vehicles and Australian Personal Injury Compensation Schemes’ (2017) 
24(1) Torts Law Journal 32, 33. Catastrophic injuries narrowly include spinal cord injury, 
traumatic brain injury, multiple amputations, serious burns, and permanent traumatic blindness: 
Treasury (Cth), ‘Agreed Minimum Benchmarks for Motor Vehicle Accidents’ (Web Page) 
<https://treasury.gov.au/programs-initiatives-consumers-community/niis/agreed-minimum-
benchmarks-for-motor-vehicle-accidents>. 
18 There are too many US states to list here. A helpful tabulation may be found at Insurance 
Information Institute, ‘Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance’ (Web Page, 6 November 2018) 
<www.iii.org/article/background-on-no-fault-auto-insurance>. A more detailed (but dated) 
survey is available at James M Anderson, Paul Heaton and Stephen J Carroll, The US Experience 
with No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Retrospective (RAND, 2010) 7–17. 
19 See Road Traffic Act 1988 (UK); Road Traffic Act (Singapore, cap 276, 2004 rev ed); Road 
Traffic Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 374. 
Note: A final version of this pre-print is to be published in the Torts Law Journal 
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liability against insurers for AV accidents. 20  Many civil law jurisdictions, 
meanwhile, impose strict liability for MVAs.21 Liability is presumed unless the 
defendant driver proves that the accident fulfils certain ‘escape clauses’, such as 
force majeure or contributory negligence.22 Finally, pure no-fault systems exist in 
Israel, New Zealand, Sweden, as well as Quebec (and other Canadian territories).23 
Although the line between strict and no-fault liability is not always clear, notice 
that while strict liability does not require negligence fault to be proven, the victim 
still needs to establish in a tort claim that the accident was caused by the 
defendant. In pure no-fault systems, however, a victim’s insurance claim may be 
grounded upon the mere fact of injury; the identity (and presence of) the defendant 
driver may be entirely irrelevant.24 
Given this paper’s tort law focus, its thesis applies most to strict liability and 
negligence-based regimes (collectively, ‘tort-based’ regimes) and least to no-fault 
regimes. Despite Australia’s notable shift toward no-fault, tort-based regimes are 
                                                 
20 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (UK) s 2. For commentary on the Act see James 
Marson, Katy Ferris and Jill Dickinson, ‘The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 Part 1 
and Beyond: A Critical Review’ (2020) 41(3) Statute Law Review 395. 
21 Schellekens, ‘No-Fault Compensation Schemes for Self-Driving Vehicles’ (n 5) 317. 
22 As of 2006, strict liability countries included France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Austria. The scope of available escape clauses depends on jurisdiction: Andrea 
Renda and Lorna Schrefler, ‘Compensation of Victims of Cross-Border Road Traffic Accidents in 
the EU: Assessment of Selected Options’ Study for the Directorate-General for Internal Policies of 
the European Parliament, Brussels (Briefing Note, March 2007) 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/378292/IPOL-
JURI_ET(2007)378292_EN.pdf> 3–4. Japan’s provides likewise. See Seiichi Ochiai, ‘Civil 
Liability for Automated Driving Systems in Japan’ in Toa Reinsurance Co Ltd, Japan’s Insurance 
Market 2018 (Brochure, 2018) 
<www.toare.co.jp/english/img/knowledge/pdf/2018_insurance.pdf>; Automobile Liability 
Security Act (No 97) 1955 (Japan) art 3. 
23 Schellekens, ‘No-Fault Compensation Schemes for Self-Driving Vehicles’ (n 5) 320. 
24 The New Zealand Ministry of Transport considers the fact that their MVA legislation does not 
explicitly require vehicles to have drivers as a ‘particular advantage’ of their regime with respect 






still widely relied on both within and beyond the jurisdiction. The NIIS, to recall, 
covers only particularly severe injuries. Given further that tort-based regimes 
appear at first glance to be worse-equipped for allocating AV liability than its no-
fault counterpart, it remains important to examine how tort law principles might 
be applied to AVs, if at all. Since MVA fault in Australia and neighbouring 
common law jurisdictions are generally allocated by negligence, the rest of this 
article will focus on the same. 
Compensation in a negligence-based regime ‘depends on showing that personal 
injury was sustained as a result of…a negligent human driver’. 25  Although 
negligence standards differ across jurisdictions, virtually all negligence-based 
systems place primary liability incidence on drivers. Disagreement occurs not on 
who should be liable, but on when liability arises and how it is enforced. Existing 
regimes are thus often described as ‘driver-centric’, suggesting that they cannot 
apply to driverless cars.26 This point will be scrutinised below in Part 0(D). 
To be sure, even where legal liability is allocated by negligence, the tortfeasor’s 
practical ability to pay is typically ensured with additional statutory insurance 
                                                 
25 Brady et al (n 17) 35. 
26 See, eg, Donald G Gifford, ‘Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam Locomotives, 
Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation’ (2018) 11(1) Journal of Tort Law 71, 138; 
Simon Chesterman, ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Autonomy’ (2020) 1(2) Notre Dame 
Journal on Emerging Technologies 210, 215. Abraham and Rabin use the term ‘driver-focused’ to 
refer to the same. See Abraham and Rabin (n 5) 133. See also Shavell, ‘Redesign Accident Liability’ 
(n 5) 2, noting that ‘ 
[t]he major rule of tort liability that we apply today [that] concerns [the] fault of the driver…will 
be irrelevant when there are no drivers in active command of their vehicles’. Shavell explicitly 
points out, however, that his proposal, strict liability to the state, ‘does not depend on the 
assumption that vehicles are autonomous …  
Ibid 29. For non-academic settings see, eg, Michael Roemer, Steffen Gaenzle and Christian Weiss, 
‘How Automakers Can Survive the Self-Driving Era’ (Report, AT Kearney, 2016) 
<www.kearney.com/documents/20152/434078/How+Automakers+Can+Survive+the+Self-
Driving+Era+%282%29.pdf/3025b1a0-4d71-e24d-51e0-2cc1f290447c>; Timothy Blute, ‘Preparing 
for the Inevitable: The Future of Autonomous Vehicles’, NGA Future (Blog Post, 13 January 2018) 
<https://medium.com/nga-future/preparing-for-the-inevitable-the-future-of-autonomous-
vehicles-e8e7af23b3e6>. 
Note: A final version of this pre-print is to be published in the Torts Law Journal 
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obligations centred on vehicle owners and/or drivers.27 The claims process may 
operate so much on established heuristics for determining fault and computing 
damages that victim compensation can be a relatively straightforward process 
which does not actually require fault to be proven in court.28 This does not, 
however, imply that tort principles are effectively irrelevant. As Part II(D) will 
explain, where fault lies naturally shapes where the obligation to insure rests. 
Further, because notions of fault underpin these very heuristics, attributing fault 
is a necessary precondition for developing proper heuristics for making the AV 
claims process as efficient as what we have today for conventional vehicles. 
B A Brief History of MVA liability  
It is worth remembering that the efficacy of today’s MVA compensation schemes 
is the product of painful experience: thousands of traffic fatalities, and lawsuits, 
over decades. Questions on the future of MVA liability should thus be addressed 
against its history. A standalone body of MVA law emerged from a similar 
transitional period where an untested new technology (the automobile) gradually 
replaced a familiar one (the horse).29 ‘Riding’ and ‘driving’, then mostly used for 
horses, were held wide enough to apply to automobiles. 30  Drivers were 
‘automobilists’.31 Given America’s technological leadership then, MVA cases were 
quick to reach their courts. Almost ‘without exception [they] insisted that the rules 
                                                 
27 For a list of Australian state statutes on MVA insurance see Brady et al (n 17) 33 nn 13–15. 
For comparable statutes in other jurisdictions see above n 19. 
28 Eg, the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) ss 45–50 sets out fixed percentage fault reductions for 
factors such as non-wearing of seatbelt, intoxication, etc. See also CTP Insurance Regulator, 
‘Information for People Injured in a Vehicle Accident’ (Brochure) 
<www.ctp.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/32565/Brochure-Information-for-people-
injured-in-a-vehicle-accident.pdf>. The Singapore State Courts have published a guide detailing 
fault percentages in various accident scenarios. See Subordinate Courts (Singapore), Guidelines for 
the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (Academy Publishing, 2010). Note 
that the Singapore Subordinate Courts were recently renamed to the Singapore State Courts. 
29 Xenophon P Huddy, The Law of Automobiles (Matthew Bender, 5th ed, 1919). 
30 Ibid 17. 




of law applicable to automobile cases … were no different from those which had 
been developed in the days of the horse and buggy’.32 Thus MVA liability was 
determined by extending negligence rules developed for horses.  
So too was the UK situation until the Road Traffic Act 1930 (UK) c 43 provided 
comprehensive legislation to address the burgeoning number of traffic accidents.33  
The Act’s ‘major innovation’ was a system of compulsory insurance that, though 
strongly opposed then, raises little controversy now. 34  Negligence alone was 
unsatisfactory because accident victims commonly overcame costly litigation only 
to find tortfeasors insolvent and judgment-proof.35 The compulsory insurance 
scheme was designed specifically to ensure that costs fell not ‘upon funds derived 
largely from the generosity of the charitable’ but ‘on those by whom in equity it 
should be borne’ by compelling motorists to pay regular premiums.36 It was not 
meant to disturb tort liability principles. Victims were still to prove negligence 
before being entitled to compensation.37  
C Unpacking ‘Driver-Centricity’ 
Driver-centricity, in short, emerged from the search for practical, fair, and efficient 
means of victim compensation in light of a negligence-based regime inherited from 
the days of the horse and buggy. As explained below in Part 0(D), the natural 
person to owe the negligence duty was the driver. With liability centred on the 
driver, insurance obligations followed. 
                                                 
32 Richard M Nixon, ‘Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation’ (1936) 3(4) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 476, 476. 
33 See Francis Deak, ‘Compulsory Liability Insurance under the British Road Traffic Acts of 1930 
and 1934’ (1936) 3(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 565. 
34 Ibid 576. A similar need was underscored in Royal Commission on Transport, The Control of 
Traffic on Roads (Cmd 3365, 1929) 3–8. 
35 See Deak (n 33). 
36 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 18 December 1929, vol 75, col 1493 
(Lord Somerleyton), quoting Voluntary Hospitals Commission, Termination of the Inquiry (Final 
Report, June 1928). 
37 Deak (n 33) 569. 
Note: A final version of this pre-print is to be published in the Torts Law Journal 
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‘Driver-centricity’ can thus be unpacked into two layers. First, drivers are central 
in law as the focal point of tort liability. Second, drivers are central in practice 
because compulsory insurance identify them as the first parties victims consider 
suing, possibly even if the accident was caused by manufacturing defects.38 The 
layers interact. Denning MR in Nettleship v Weston suggested that judges had, 
since the Road Traffic Acts, become more willing to pin negligence liability on 
drivers, even in the absence of fault, because this better accorded with the policy 
of compulsory insurance.39 Likewise, although American law was slow to adopt 
compulsory insurance,40 the courts there, ‘though speaking always in terms of fault, 
have at times stretched the traditional formulas to the breaking point in order to 
insure recovery to an injured plaintiff’.41  
D Driving, control, and liability 
Existing MVA liability regimes represent a shifting balance jurisdictions strike in 
the allocation of MVA costs that has been gradually yet continually fine-tuned 
over time.42 What has not changed, however, is that driver-centric negligence 
regimes remain the dominant model of MVA liability. Why are drivers natural 
liability magnets? The intuitive answer is that drivers control the vehicle. This is 
central to a proper understanding of the basis of MVA liability but, given our 
historical focus on drivers, appears under-appreciated. This sub-Part scrutinises 
the relationship between driving, control, and liability. 
1  ‘Driving’ as Control 
A standards document issued by the Society of Automotive Engineers known in 
the literature as ‘J3016’ decomposes driving into specific ‘strategic’, ‘operational’, 
                                                 
38 There is, beyond this article’s scope, a third, regulation layer that as noted in Part 0 attaches 
centrally onto drivers as well. 
39 [1971] 2 QB 691, 699–700. 
40 See generally Deak (n 33). 
41 Nixon (n 32) 490. 




and ‘tactical’ tasks.43 Strategic tasks include planning destinations and waypoints; 
operational tasks include steering, braking, and monitoring road picture; tactical 
tasks include responding to road events and changing lanes.44 The operational and 
tactical aspects of driving together comprise the ‘dynamic driving task’ (‘DDT’).45 
A vehicle’s automation level turns solely on how far the DDT is automated.46 
J3016 identifies six levels of automation, from 0 to 265. Truly ‘automated’ vehicles 
are those at or above Level 3. At that level (‘conditional automation’), the ADS 
handles steering, acceleration, and road picture monitoring, subject to an 
‘expectation that a fall-back ready [human] is receptive to an ADS-issued request 
to intervene … and will respond appropriately’.47 At Levels 4 and 5, reliance on 
human safeguards is progressively removed.48 
The preceding suggests that ‘driving’ is best understood as a continuum. One is 
more or less of a driver depending on the driving tasks performed. While dynamic, 
operational tasks appear most integral to ‘driving’, not all such tasks are necessary 
for it. Command of the gear shift and clutch, for example, has long been obviated 
by automatic transmissions, yet automatic car operators are still clearly ‘drivers’ 
in both the lay and legal sense. Taking this further, if one merely steered a vehicle 
while software determines its speed, is one still ‘driving’? Decomposing driving 
into its component tasks avoids this conundrum: one simply ‘drives’ the vehicle’s 
direction while the ADS ‘drives’ the vehicle’s speed. 
                                                 
43 On-Road Automated Driving Committee, ‘Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to 
Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles’ (Ground Vehicle Standard No 
J3016_201806, SAE International, 15 June 2018) 34 <www.sae.org/content/j3016_201806> 
(‘J3016’). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 6. 
46 Ibid 19. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
Note: A final version of this pre-print is to be published in the Torts Law Journal 
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It follows that the extent one ‘drives’ depends on the tasks one controls. To be 
sure, while J3016 is widely relied on by scholars and regulators,49 it is expressly 
not intended as a legal definition.50 It is thus crucial that legal definitions of 
‘driving’ are likewise premised on control. Specifically, Brady et al identify a 
number of Australian road traffic laws that define driving as being ‘in control of’ 
a vehicle.51 Leading Australian authority interprets this to require ‘some control 
of the propulsive force which, if operating, will cause the car to move’.52 As 
Tranter notes, this represents a ‘pragmatic approach … which involves factual 
considerations relating to responsibility for the primary controls, the steering, the 
accelerator and the brake’.53 
Can these statutory definitions be read more broadly than J3016 to deal with AV 
liability? Specifically, if one merely controlled the ADS which in turn controls the 
vehicle’s propulsion, might one still be ‘in control of’ the vehicle? If so, would one 
be liable for its accidents? 
2 Control as the Source of Liability 
The crux of the question lies in what ‘control’ means. This will be dealt with 
separately in the following Part. The point here is that although we are 
accustomed to centralising MVA liability around drivers, we are in truth 
interested in liability for controllers — and justifiably so. Control is associable 
with moral fault through the well-established Control Principle:54 the more a 
                                                 
49 Department of Transportation (US), Preparing for the Future of Transportation: Automated 
Vehicle 3.0 (October 2018). Most of the literature cited throughout this article import this 
definition. 
50 On-Road Automated Driving Committee (n 43) 18. 
51 Brady et al (n 17) 36–7. 
52 Tink v Francis [1983] 2 VR 17. See also Kieran Tranter, ‘The Challenges of Autonomous Motor 
Vehicles for Queensland Road and Criminal Laws’ (2016) 16(2) Queensland University of 
Technology Law Review 59, 65. 
53 Tranter (n 52) 66. 
54 Mehmet Y Gurdal, Joshua B Miller and Aldo Rustichini, ‘Why Blame?’ (2013) 121(6) Journal 




rational agent controls his or her actions, the more those actions reflect not only 
the agent’s intentions and beliefs but also the agent’s view of ‘all the reasons that 
apply to the occasion, and ways of pursuing [those reasons]’.55 It is then natural 
to hold that individual responsible for those actions.56 While moral responsibility 
should be distinguished from legal liability,57 the link between MVA liability and 
control is equally well-established. As Huddy wrote in 1919: 
Sec 655. Liability based on control of machine. 
Liability for the operation of a motor vehicle is imposed on the person having ‘control’ of 
its movements. Primarily, this is the chauffeur, and he is, of course, charged with his 
personal negligence. But liability may go farther than a personal judgment against the 
driver, for the doctrine of respondeat superior may charge his employer or the owner of 
the machine with liability. The negligence of the driver, moreover, may be imputed to one 
having control, though such person is not the owner of the machine or the employer.58 
  
Indeed, instrumental and non-instrumental rationales of tort law converge on 
driver liability, given that they are in positions of both least-cost avoidance and 
moral responsibility where MVA risks are concerned.59 It is nonetheless crucial to 
understand ‘driver-centricity’ as an artefact of (moral and legal) control principles. 
                                                 
55 Joseph Raz, ‘Being in the World’ (2010) 23(4) Ratio 433, 436. Although Raz rejects the 
universal-sufficiency of the control principle as the basis of responsibility for all actions, he accepts 
that the control principle together with the intention principle form the ‘paradigmatic cases’ of 
rational agent moral responsibility for actions: at 451. 
56 Eg, through Gardner’s ‘basic responsibility’. See John Gardner, ‘The Negligence Standard: 
Political Not Metaphysical’ (2017) 80(1) Modern Law Review 1. 
57 See generally Peter Cane, ‘Morality, Law and Conflicting Reasons for Action’ (2012) 71(1) 
Cambridge Law Journal 59. On motor accidents specifically, Goudkamp observes that courts have 
‘frequently [found] drivers liable in circumstances in which there is little or no evidence of moral 
blameworthiness’. See James Goudkamp, ‘The Spurious Relationship between Moral 
Blameworthiness and Liability for Negligence’ (2004) 28(2) Melbourne University Law Review 342, 
353. 
58 Huddy (n 29) 849 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
59 By ‘instrumental’ I refer to utilitarian and/or functional accounts of tort law and by non-
instrumental I refer to all others. See Richard A Posner, ‘Instrumental and Noninstrumental 
Theories of Tort Law’ (2013) 88(2) Indiana Law Review 469, 469. 
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Liability attaches not because of one’s ‘driverness’, but because of one’s control 
of the vehicle.60 The legal question should then not be who drives an AV, which 
misleadingly implies that any software that drives should be liable for resulting 
accidents, but who controls the AV, which conversely clarifies that the absence of 
a driver is not fatal to legal doctrine provided control may be established. This 
necessitates a careful definition of legal ‘control’. 
III Clarifying Legal Control 
Smith has argued that the ‘inconsistent use’ of terms like control by lawyers and 
engineers has engendered unnecessary confusion.61 J3016 likewise notes that 
[b]ecause the term ‘control’ has numerous technical, legal, and popular meanings, using it 
without careful qualification can confuse rather than clarify. In law, for example, ‘control,’ 
‘actual physical control,’ and ‘ability to control’ can have distinct meanings that bear 
little relation to engineering control loops. Similarly, the statement that the (human) driver 
‘does not have control’ may unintentionally and erroneously suggest the loss of all human 
authority.62 
An underappreciated distinction must be drawn between control as an engineering 
concept and as a legal doctrine. In engineering control theory, a ‘controller’ is said 
to control an object (the ‘control plant’) only when the controller can make specific 
input choices that translate into the object exhibiting desired output behaviours.63 
Such control is not premised on legal capacity, but on a precise definition of the 
relevant ‘control system’, which broadly comprise the set of inputs, outputs, and 
                                                 
60 This is not merely a matter of semantics. As Parts 0 and 0 below demonstrate, it is possible to 
legally control a vehicle without physically driving it. 
61 Bryant Walker Smith, ‘Lawyers and Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language’ in 
Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin and Ian Kerr (eds), Robot Law (Edward Elgar, 2016) 78. 
62 On-Road Automated Driving Committee (n 43) 29. 
63 Smith (n 61) 83 n 18. On control theory generally see James Ron Leigh, Control Theory: A 




translational processes one is interested in studying.64 Controlling a vehicle’s 
direction, for instance, involves setting the steering wheel to a specific angle 
corresponding to the desired output direction. If a defect in the vehicle’s 
differentials causes the front axle to turn in entirely random directions for any 
given wheel input, control does not exist. Engineering control, therefore, focuses 
on a vehicle’s physical variables such as speed and heading. This is what an 
engineer or layperson means when they, not inaccurately, assert that ‘no one 
controls an AV when the ADS is driving’. 
Courts need not and indeed do not use ‘control’ the same way. A survey of how 
control is analysed in the precedents below show that tort law is instead concerned 
with the determination of the metaphysical risks of harm posed to society. 
Foremost, control is a salient feature for ascertaining negligence duties. In Perre 
v Apand Pty Ltd,65  the defendant company Apand invited the Sparnons to 
participant in a potato growing experiment and negligently introduced bacterial 
wilt onto the Sparnons’ farm by providing them with infected potato seed. 
Western Australian regulations then prohibited the importation into Western 
Australia of potatoes grown on neighbouring farms as well, inflicting pure 
economic losses on the Perres’ farms.66 Holding that Apand owed the Perres a 
duty of care, the HCA emphasised how Apand had been in a position of ‘control 
over the experiment and where it would occur’.67 Thus, the ‘relevant risk to the 
commercial interests of [the Perres] was in the exclusive control of Apand’.68 It 
did not matter that Apand did not control the physical mechanism through which 
the economic loss was occasioned: the Sparnons planted the infected seeds and the 
import restrictions were government-imposed. 
                                                 
64 Smith (n 61) 85. Smith further argues that because ‘most automatic control systems can be 
defined broadly enough that they involve a human and narrowly enough that they do not … system 
definition could drive the legal conclusion’: at 84. 
65 (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
66 Ibid 191–2 [2]–[4]. 
67 Ibid 236 [149] (McHugh J). 
68 Ibid 259–60 [216] (McHugh J). 
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A similar focus on risk control can be observed in contexts involving physical harm 
arising in connection with property (which more readily analogises to MVAs). In 
Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd,69 where fire from the defendant’s 
land damaged the plaintiff’s goods, the five-judge majority held that circumstances 
which prima facie attract liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher70 are 
characterized by ‘a central element of control’, in that the defendant has taken 
advantage of their control of premises to undertake or allow a dangerous activity 
thereon, thereby exposing the plaintiff, who had no such control, to a ‘foreseeable 
risk of danger’.71 
Similarly, the duty of care that occupiers owe entrants ‘arise[s] from the ... right 
of control over the premises and those who enter them’.72 The Singapore Court of 
Appeal has held that occupiers with control of premises owe a ‘prima facie duty 
of care to lawful entrants’ because it is ‘eminently foreseeable that entrants will 
suffer damage if occupiers do not take reasonable care to eliminate danger’.73 
Control of risks is also pivotal in multi-party scenarios. The High Court in Burnie 
held that, as with Rylands, relationships giving rise to non-delegable duties were 
commonly characterised by a “central element of control”.74 In New South Wales 
v Lepore, McHugh J, argued that a school authority owed its pupils a non-
delegable duty of care because the ‘school authority has control of the pupil whose 
immaturity is likely to lead to harm to the pupil unless the authority exercises 
reasonable care in supervising him or her’.75  McHugh J’s analysis of non-delegable 
                                                 
69 (1994) 179 CLR 520 (‘Burnie’). 
70 (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
71 Ibid [37] (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This case also abolished the application of 
Rylands in Australia by subsuming it into negligence. 
72 Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469, 480–1 [30] (McHugh J). 
73 See Toh Siew Kee v Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 284, 316–7 [77]–[80] (Court 
of Appeal) (‘See Toh’). The case also clarifies that in Singapore, like in Australia but unlike in 
England, occupier’s liability is subsumed under the common law of negligence: at 316 [76]. 
74 Burnie (n 69) 330 [36]. 
75 (2003) 212 CLR 511, 563–4 [139] (McHugh J). See also Woodland v Essex County Council [2014] 




duties was notably not shared by the majority who preferred to base the decision 
on vicarious liability instead.76 Yet in vicarious liability as well, the control test 
has long been ‘of vital importance’ in establishing a sufficient relationship between 
employer and primary tortfeasor. 77  In the classic case of Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board v Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd, 78  the harbour board 
remained vicariously liable for the tort of a crane-driver the board had hired out 
because control of how the crane-driver drove had not been transferred to the 
hirer. In English law, control remains one of five key policy factors that make it 
‘fair, just, and reasonable’ to hold the employer liable for the employee’s tort.79 
Notably, although control ‘does not have the significance which once it did’ in 
vicarious liability because today’s ‘employer is likely to be able to tell an employee 
what to do but not (at least always) how to do it,’80 the English courts’ response 
was precisely to clarify that legal ‘control’ is broader than physically determining 
what is done. Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council81 held that a County 
Council could be vicariously liable for sexual abuse by foster parents to whom the 
Council entrusted the claimant. Lord Reed, who delivered the leading judgment, 
pinned the Council’s control on how: 
[a]lthough the foster parents controlled the organisation and management of their 
household … and dealt with most aspects of the daily care of the children without 
immediate supervision … The local authority exercised powers of approval, inspection, 
supervision and removal without any parallel in ordinary family life. By virtue of those 
powers, the local authority exercised a significant degree of control over both what the 
foster parents did and how they did it …82 
                                                 
76 Ibid [34]–[38] (Gleeson CJ), [270] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
77 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1, 16 [37] (‘CCWS’). 
78 [1947] AC 1. 
79 CCWS (n 77) 15 [35(e)], applied by both majority and minority in Barclays Bank plc v Various 
Claimants [2020] 2 WLR 960 (‘Barclays’). 
80 Barclays (n 79) 967–8 [20]. 
81 [2018] AC 355. 
82 Ibid 379 [62] (emphasis added). See also Barclays (n 79) 967–8 [20]. 
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Across these legal contexts, active physical control of the subject is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to constitute legal control; what matters is that the 
controller is in a position to determine the risks of harm the subject poses to 
society. The vicariously liable employer need not have physically steered the 
employee like a puppet; nor does the employee’s unquestionable human autonomy 
preclude the former from ‘controlling’ them.83 Rather, powers of approval or 
supervision may suffice, as long as the defendant had set a risk in motion. 
To be sure, physical control is indicative of legal control because physical states 
and behaviours shape metaphysical risks. Indeed, conventional drivers legally 
control vehicles by physically controlling them. The touchstone being risk control, 
however, means the crux lies in identifying specific states and/or behaviours 
responsible for risk creation, and determining if the putative controller was in a 
position to determine these inputs. This accords with the old principle that an 
occupier who controls the general state of affairs on land is less likely liable than 
one who controls the dynamic activities giving rise to the harm.84 Nonetheless, 
physical and legal control are conceptually separable: one could physically control 
system attributes unrelated to risk creation, or conversely be in a legal position to 
determine a system’s risks without physically controlling the system itself.85 
IV Legal Control of Automated Vehicles 
Any entity in a position to determine a vehicle’s risks, therefore, might be said to 
be in legal control of that vehicle — even one physically controlled by an ADS. 
                                                 
83 Consider also that we have no problems assigning liability to horse carriage drivers even though 
horses can be said to have ‘autonomous’ minds and can also be unpredictable. See David King, 
‘Putting the Reins on Autonomous Vehicle Liability: Why Horse Accidents Are the Best Common 
Law Analogy’ (2018) 19(4) North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 128, 147–8. On the 
definition of autonomy in the AV context see Mark Chinen, Law and Autonomous Machines: The 
Co-Evolution of Legal Responsibility and Technology (Edward Elgar, 2019) 3–5. 
84 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479, 486. For a review of the 
history and current Commonwealth treatment of the static-dynamic classification see See Toh (n 
73) 305–16 [41]–[75]. 




Yet even if ADS-driven vehicles can, in law, be controlled by a separate legal 
entity, it remains to be seen whether they are so controlled. A control-centric view 
clarifies that, far from there being no one ‘driver’ to pin liability upon, a range of 
potential defendants arise by virtue of their participation in AV risk creation. 
These include vehicle manufacturers, software developers, fleet operators, vehicle 
operators such as safety drivers, and possibly consumers. To provide necessary 
context, this Part first outlines how AV technology and businesses operate before 
analysing how each entity legally controls an AV. 
A How AV Technology Operates 
An ADS comprises ‘the hardware and software that are collectively capable of 
performing the entire DDT on a sustained basis’.86 This importantly dispels 
misconceptions that artificially-intelligent software is all that is required. There is 
no such ‘magic’ to automated driving.87 Instead, an ADS is itself a complex system 
of interconnected software elements that graft onto hardware systems like the 
steering and braking assemblies.88 Relevant hardware include cameras, LiDARs, 
radars, GPS systems, and other devices first used to sense the AV’s surroundings. 
Environmental data from these sensors are necessary but are insufficient for 
automated driving until interpreted by the ADS software. Typical ADS software 
process data in three stages, in order: perception, decision and planning, and 
control.89 Sensor data is first analysed by perception modules that detect a range 
                                                 
86 On-Road Automated Driving Committee (n 43) 3 (emphasis in original). This was adopted in 
NTC, Changing Driving Laws to Support Automated Vehicles (n 8).  See also National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety (September 
2017) <www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-
ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf>. 
87 Hannah YeeFen Lim, Autonomous Vehicles and the Law: Technology, Algorithms and Ethics 
(Edward Elgar, 2018) 2. 
88 On the technology see generally ibid. 
89 Wenhao Zong et al, ‘Architecture Design and Implementation of an Autonomous Vehicle’ (2018) 
6 IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) Access 21956, 21959. There, the authors 
provide an instructive diagram that enumerates specific modules within each category, such as the 
lane marks recognition module and the vehicle and pedestrian detection module. 
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of objects of interest like traffic lights, lane markings, and pedestrians. Algorithms 
are deployed to interpret the sensor data.90 For example, an image classification 
algorithm, commonly based on a neural network, could be used to identify 
pedestrians and other road obstacles from out of the camera feed.91 Notably, while 
some modules may involve machine learning (‘ML’) techniques, and thus implicate 
the range of legal complications that ML raises, other computational techniques 
are also involved. For instance, certain lane detection algorithms use only linear 
algebra and matrix operations that need not be trained.92 
The enriched data is then sent to the decision and planning modules which decide 
on a course of action given the general road picture as well as the target destination. 
Again, these could involve both deterministic and non-deterministic algorithms.93 
Further, certain aspects of the vehicle’s behaviour may be hard-coded (that is, 
predetermined) by developers. 94  To illustrate, developers may specify in the 
decision module that if a pedestrian is detected in the middle of the detected lane, 
then the vehicle’s desired speed should be set to zero. Finally, the chosen action(s) 
are piped into the control module which, in turn, causes the vehicle’s hardware to 
accordingly produce the speed, bearings, and other physical variables desired.95 
It should be noted that ADS architectures, including the sensors and algorithms, 
differ across developer. Indeed, developers guard their ADS recipes cautiously.96  
                                                 
90 On machine learning (‘ML’) in AVs see Brian S Haney, ‘The Optimal Agent: The Future of 
Autonomous Vehicles & Liability Theory’ (2020) 30(1) Albany Law Journal of Science and 
Technology 1. 
91 YeeFen Lim (n 87) 15. 
92  Yang Xing et al, ‘Advances in Vision-Based Lane Detection: Algorithms, Integration, 
Assessment, and Perspectives on ACP-Based Parallel Vision’ (2018) 5(3) IEEE/CAA (Chinese 
Association of Automation) Journal of Automatica Sinica 645.  
93 YeeFen Lim (n 87) 16. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Zong et al (n 89) 21959. 




B AV Business Models 
There are two primary models through which AVs are made available to 
consumers. First, AVs may first be sold directly to consumers like conventional 
vehicles. A number of partially automated Teslas are now in private use on 
American roads. While these are not fully-automated vehicles in the J3016 sense, 
the Tesla model indicates a possible future. Tesla’s Autopilot system lets users 
determine ‘speed limit offsets’ that represent how far the vehicle may deviate from 
road limits.97 Users may also tweak how abruptly the vehicle changes lanes. Tesla 
calls the most extreme setting ‘Mad Max’ mode. 98  The company has also 
announced that riders may be allowed to choose between ‘gradually more 
aggressive’ driving modes.99 Fully-automated consumer AVs, however, remain a 
distant prospect given technological constraints.100  
The second model involves intermediary platforms offering on-demand AV rides 
to consumers. Google subsidiary Waymo, for instance, launched an automated 
taxi service in late 2019 that transported 6,299 passengers in its first month.101 
Like today’s ride-hailing platforms, these ‘fleet operators’ need not manufacture 
or own their own AVs. In practice, however, fleet operators tend to be technology 
companies which offer rides precisely because they had developed, and wish to test, 
                                                 
97  For an illustration of the settings panel see ‘Autopilot Settings’, Teslarati (Web Page) 
<www.teslarati.com/first-experience-tesla-autopilot-features/autopilot-settings/>. See also Tesla, 
‘Support: Discover Software Version 9.0’ (Web Page) <www.tesla.com/support/software-
v9?redirect=no#controls> for the suite of configurable settings. 
98 Sean O’Kane, ‘Elon Musk Says Tesla Will Allow Aggressive Autopilot Mode with “Slight Chance 




100 Alex Davies, ‘The WIRED Guide to Self-Driving Cars’, Wired (online, 13 December 2018) 
<www.wired.com/story/guide-self-driving-cars/>. 
101 Kirsten Korosec, ‘Waymo’s Robotaxi Pilot Surpassed 6,200 Riders in Its First Month in 
California’, Techcrunch (online, 17 September 2019) 
<https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/16/waymos-robotaxi-pilot-surpassed-6200-riders-in-its-first-
month-in-california/>. 
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an AV. Importantly, fleets may be monitored and/or physically controlled by 
operators through overarching ‘fleet control systems’.102 
C Tracing Control to Manufacturers, Developers, Fleet Operators, 
and Consumers 
It should by now be clear that even though the ADS commands most of the 
physical control in a highly automated vehicle, legal control of AV risks nonetheless 
resides, in varying degrees and forms, in manufacturers, developers, fleet operators, 
and consumers. 
Manufacturers control AV hardware risks. If defective brakes cause an AV 
accident, there should be little doubt that the manufacturer is liable. Victims may, 
of course, have some difficulty proving that an accident was due to hardware 
defects where AVs are concerned, but the problem here is a factual rather than 
legal one. Complications may arise if defective hardware in turn causes an ADS 
error. Suppose a defective LiDAR fails to sense a pedestrian and the ADS, driving 
with erroneous sensor data, crashes into them. But even here, there is no question 
as to the manufacturer’s control (and indeed fault). The issue is whether the 
developer also contributed to the actualized risk, so as to be a co-defendant. 
Developers make deliberate design choices in building an ADS. This applies 
especially to any hard-coded or deterministic ADS components, but extends 
                                                 
102 General Motors subsidiary Cruise announced in early 2019 an SAE Level 4 AV which was to 
be monitored live from the company’s fleet control room: Chris Teague, ‘The Cruise Origin Is 
GM’s Driverless Shared Shuttle Pod: And It’s Headed for Mass Production’, The Drive (online, 
21 January 2020) <www.thedrive.com/news/31913/the-cruise-origin-is-gms-driverless-shared-
shuttle-pod-and-its-headed-for-mass-production>. The startup Drive.ai, since acquired by Apple, 
had ‘fleet control operators’ on standby to take over the wheel remotely if necessary: Andrew J 
Hawkins, ‘Fully Driverless Cars Are on Public Roads in Texas’, The Verge (online, 17 May 2018) 
<www.theverge.com/2018/5/17/17365188/drive-ai-driverless-self-driving-car-texas>; Andrew J 
Hawkins and Sean Hollister, ‘Apple Buys Self-Driving Startup Drive.ai Just Days before It Would 





equally to ML components. The argument that the ‘black box’ nature of ML 
algorithms obfuscates legal analyses of intent and causality103 does not apply to 
control: the engineering concept of a ‘black box’ describes precisely systems for 
which we may ‘relate stimuli to responses without regard to the parts or organs 
of the system’.104 ‘Black boxes’ are by original definition systems that can be 
controlled even where the controller does not fully understand the system’s 
internal workings. The narrow ML algorithms typically used in today’s ADSes are 
broadly output-predictable: a neural network trained for road sign detection would 
not, when provided a road image, perform lane detection instead. It is also possible 
to generate explanations of (black box) algorithms by probing its behaviour 
against different inputs.105 
Further, even if developers do not physically control how the ADS ultimately 
behaves, they are nonetheless in a position to determine the societal risks an ADS 
constitutes. Developers control how extensively a ML algorithm is trained, how 
stringently the ADS is tested before it is released to consumers, and whether the 
ADS is released at all. 
Apart from possible additional roles as manufacturer or developer, fleet operators 
also participate in AV risks. Operators can monitor active AVs via fleet control 
systems enabled by the rich data network that AV systems create. This puts them 
in a unique informational and resource position for regulating AV safety. 
Operators can further choose between different ADS and vehicle offerings: if one 
opts for deploying untested software in its vehicles without further testing, or 
installs software incompatible with its hardware systems, liability logically follows.  
                                                 
103 Yavar Bathaee, ‘The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation’ 
(2018) 31(2) Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 889. 
104 Mario Bunge, ‘A General Black Box Theory’ (1963) 30(4) Philosophy of Science 346. Recall 
from Part 0 that the essence of engineering control is the ability to choose inputs to achieve desired 
output behaviours. For how neural networks operate in AVs see Haney (n 90) 9–21. 
105 Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Chris Russell, ‘Counterfactual Explanations Without 
Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR’ (2018) 31(2) Harvard Journal of 
Law and Technology 841. 
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Further, as the primary consumer-facing entity, operators decide precaution levels 
in consumer offerings. A crucial decision is whether to provide safety drivers. 
Notably, a cautious operator who does so may be vicariously liable for accidents 
the driver should reasonably have prevented (regardless of whether an ADS failure 
was involved). It would be absurd if, for the same ADS and vehicle set-up, a less 
cautious operator who forgoes safety drivers is placed in a better position. 
Lastly, consumers may also participate in AV risk creation through user settings 
(notably exposed to them by either manufacturers, developers, and/or operators). 
To recall Tesla’s customisable settings, should one choose large speed limit offset 
and a ‘Mad Max’ driving policy, one should arguably bear some if not all of any 
resulting accident costs. 
D Special Features of AV Control 
Contrasting AV control with that of conventional vehicles illuminates how AVs 
challenge tort law. Conventionally, physical and legal control of MVA were both 
centred on drivers. AVs do not only dissociate physical from legal control; they 
distribute legal control amongst parties across the AV supply and consumption 
chain.106 The content of such control also differs: while human drivers determine 
accident risks by contemporaneously determining a vehicle’s physical speed and 
direction, ADS risks are largely determined pre-emptively in the 
manufacturing/development process. 107 As Shavell has noted, sequential torts 
                                                 
106 This is a legal instance of Elish’s insight that, for complex systems, moral responsibility is often 
centred solely on particular human actors even though systematic control is distributed over a 
range of actors. Elish calls these ‘moral crumple zones’ that society constructs to protect the overall 
integrity of that system: Madeleine Clare Elish, ‘Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in 
Human-Robot Interaction’ (2019) 5 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 40. Chinen likewise 
notes that, for autonomous systems generally, one solution may be to disaggregate responsibility 
and cast a wider net over who may be held responsible: Chinen (n 83) 232–5. 
107 Though as noted above operators and consumers determine some risks contemporaneously. See 




involve different behavioural incentives from simultaneous ones. 108  Because 
manufacturers and developers act ex ante, they may, in fact, be in a better position 
than human drivers to invest in precaution.109 
The control paradigm for AVs is thus fundamentally different. The problem is not 
that there is no longer a driver, nor that manufacturers or developers are the new 
drivers. Rather, in some sense, everyone is a driver, though in a different way from 
the past and from each other. This may however be recast as an opportunity for 
legal systems to choose who should bear liability for AV accidents. Since control 
may be traced to each of them, manufacturers, developers, operators, and/or riders 
may be held primarily (or jointly and/or severally) liable. Conventional motor 
vehicles did not present this choice; any liability system not centralised first on 
drivers would have been strange and unstable. How jurisdictions make this choice 
may ultimately be a function of policy priorities. This could explain the emerging 
divergence amongst major jurisdictions on AV liability.110 
V Application to Negligence 
This Part examines how courts could analyse AV negligence cases from a tortious 
control perspective, taking reference from early AV accidents. Note that as most 
cases remain in preliminary stages, the following (alleged) facts should be read 
only as illustrations of possible AV accidents. The present discussion will also limit 
                                                 
108 See Steven Shavell, ‘Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially’ (1983) 26(3) Journal 
of Law and Economics 589. 
109 Abraham and Rabin (n 5) 29. 
110 For the Australian position and the range of US academic proposals see above Part 0. The EU 
has signalled a need to examine whether AVs may ‘justify a shift in liability to the manufacturer 
which, as a risk factor that is independent of negligence, can be linked simply to the risk posed by 
bringing an autonomous vehicle onto the market’: European Parliament Resolution of 15 January 
2019 on Autonomous Driving in European Transport, P8_TA(2019)0005 (15 January 2019) [21]. 
Recent UK legislation established strict insurer liability for automated vehicles. See generally the 
Automated and Electric Vehicles Act (n 20); Marson, Ferris and Dickinson (n 20). 
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itself to narrating the broad picture, leaving a closer (control) analysis for when 
further and better case details become available. 
A Early AV Accidents 
In Nilsson v General Motors LLC (‘Nilsson’),111 the plaintiff motorcyclist was 
travelling behind a vehicle manufactured by the defendant sometime in the 
morning. The vehicle’s driver Salazar had put the vehicle in self-driving mode112 
and, according to the complaint, kept his hands off the steering wheel.113 Salazar 
commanded the vehicle to filter left, and it did. It then ‘suddenly veered back into 
[the plaintiff’s] lane’, striking and injuring him. 114  The complaint alleged 
negligence against General Motors alone without naming Salazar as defendant. 
The case settled.115 
In Umeda v Tesla Inc (‘Umeda’),116 some motorcyclists were parked behind a 
small van on the far-right lane of an expressway in Japan, following an accident 
between the van and a group member. At around 2:49pm, a Tesla Model X crashed 
headfirst into the group, killing the victim. According to the complaint, the Tesla 
driver had engaged the Autopilot about 30 minutes earlier and instructed it to 
track the vehicle in front. When that front vehicle encountered the motorcyclist 
group, it signalled and filtered left to avoid them. The Tesla, however, ‘began 
                                                 
111 Complaint, Nilsson v General Motors LLC (ND Cal, No 3:18-cv-00471-KAW, 22 January 2018) 
(‘Nilsson’). 
112 General Motors calls its ADS the ‘Cruise’ system. Around the material time in 2017, Cruise 
had been involved in a number of accidents: David Shepardson, ‘GM’s Self-Driving Cars Involved 
in Six Accidents in September’, Reuters (online, 5 October 2017) <www.reuters.com/article/autos-
selfdriving-crashes/gms-self-driving-cars-involved-in-six-accidents-in-september-
idUSL2N1MF1RO>. 
113 Nilsson (n 111) [7]. 
114 Ibid [11]. 
115 David Shepardson, ‘GM Settles Lawsuit with Motorcyclist Hit by Self-Driving Car’, Reuters 
(online, 2 June 2018) <www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-selfdriving/gm-settles-lawsuit-with-
motorcyclist-hit-by-self-driving-car-idUSKCN1IX604>. 




rapidly accelerating from about 15 km/h to approximately 38 km/h’.117 The 
complaint alleged that the vehicle did not detect the group, and that the driver 
had ‘begun to doze off’ before the incident, which thus occurred ‘without any 
actual input or action’ from the driver.118 
In Hudson v Tesla Inc (‘Hudson’),119 the plaintiff put his Tesla Model S on 
Autopilot while on a highway. He was then ‘relaxing during his [morning] commute, 
fully confident that the vehicle would “do everything else” just as Tesla 
promised’.120 Gonzalez-Bustamante, the second defendant, had left his stalled 
vehicle on the same highway lane. The plaintiff’s vehicle crashed headfirst into it, 
leaving him severely injured. 
In Sz Hua Huang v Tesla Inc (‘Huang’),121 the victim was travelling in his 
Autopiloted Tesla down a US interstate highway at around 9:27am. As the vehicle 
approached a paved area dividing the highway from an exit, the Autopilot ‘turned 
the vehicle left, out of the designated travel lane, and drove it straight into a 
concrete highway median’.122 According to a separate complaint filed in Muwafi v 
Tesla Inc (‘Muwafi’),123  which arose from the same incident, the Tesla then 
‘ricocheted back into [the highway]’ and collided with a (conventional) vehicle 
driven by the plaintiff in the second suit. 124  Both suits claimed, inter alia, 
negligence against Tesla as well as its individual employees.125 
These cases by no means exhaust all AV accidents that have occurred 
internationally. A further caveat is that they all involved Level 2, privately-owned 
                                                 
117 Ibid [27]. 
118 Ibid [27]–[29]. 
119  Complaint, Hudson v Tesla Inc (Fla Cir Ct, No 2018-CA-011812-O, 30 October 2018) 
(‘Hudson’). 
120 Ibid [42]. 
121 Complaint, Sz Hua Huang v Tesla Inc (Cal Super Ct, No 19CV346663, 26 April 2019) (‘Huang’). 
122 Ibid [25]. 
123 Complaint, Muwafi v Tesla Inc (Cal Super Ct, No 20CV365747, 26 April 2019) (‘Muwafi’). 
124 Ibid [9]. 
125 Huang (n 121) [9]; Muwafi (n 123) [12]. 
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AVs. Nonetheless, they provide the best available indication of the accident 
archetypes to be expected with AVs. In particular, given the nature of algorithmic 
failures, AV accidents may tend to be especially severe. An ADS may work well 
most of the time, but if an ADS fails, it tends to fail catastrophically, with initial 
input errors magnified in downstream modules reliant on the integrity of upstream 
inputs. Large obstacles could be completely missed in daylight. There are further 
two types of AV lawsuits: Nilsson and Umeda involved third-party road users 
harmed by AVs, while Hudson and Huang involved harm to the AV riders 
themselves. While all plaintiffs sued the AV developers; the third-party victims 
Nilsson and Umeda notably did not sue the (partially) AV drivers.126 
B Control Analysis 
Assuming for exposition that the alleged facts are true, how might control 
illuminate the courts’ analysis of the above cases? Problems with applying existing 
negligence principles to AVs have been identified in the literature, including the 
cost of verifying software standards, 127  difficulties with proving causation, 128 
questions on when human users may ‘reasonably rely’ on the ADS,129 and issues 
surrounding specific state liability statutes.130 Control analysis alleviates some of 
these concerns while reinforcing others.131 
First, it clarifies that identifying who might be liable, which retraces to establishing 
who owes victims a duty of care, may not be as difficult as sometimes thought. 
While true that the behaviour of AI systems is not completely foreseeable a 
                                                 
126 To be sure, it is not known if the drivers had privately agreed to compensate. 
127 YeeFen Lim (n 87) 82–94. 
128 Mackie (n 6). 
129 Brady et al (n 17) 42. 
130 Ibid 41. 
131 Note that although the cases considered all involved partially automated vehicles, the analysis 




priori,132 legal control, as earlier established, requires not the foreseeability of 
specific physical behaviours, but of general metaphysical risks. Tesla need not have 
actually or even reasonably foreseen that Huang’s vehicle would inexplicably veer 
left into a highway median for a duty to arise. What is required is simply that 
they could reasonably foresee that someone in Huang’s position would be harmed 
if they failed to take reasonable care in manufacturing/developing the AV/ADS.133 
Indeed, precisely because AI systems are known to act in not-completely-
predictable ways, it is eminently foreseeable that carelessness with their creation 
or sale could cause harm — particularly the physical harm that most accident 
victims will suffer.134 Similar arguments could be made for establishing negligence 
duties against operators. 
Questions of remoteness which differ only in requiring the foreseeability of the type 
of harm occasioned, can also be thus addressed.135 Carelessness in the design, 
manufacture, and indeed operation of an AV foreseeably risks physically injuring 
both AV users and other road users. 
Turning next to breach, res ipsa loquitur may be more readily applicable to AVs 
than initially apparent, alleviating (though not fully solving) the evidential 
difficulties136 that AV accident victims could face. Res ipsa requires (a) an absence 
of explanation of the occurrence that caused the harm, (b) that the accident does 
not ordinarily occur without the tortfeasor’s negligence, and (c) that the cause of 
injury was in the defendant’s exclusive control. 137  It has been applied in 
                                                 
132 Mackie argues that ‘the fundamental problem posed by machine learning techniques for the 
allocation of liability is that manufacturers are not, in principle, capable of fully predicting the 
future behaviour of the algorithms’: Mackie (n 6) 1318. 
133 To recall, Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle simply holds that ‘you must take reasonable care 
to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbour’: Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580. 
134 Mackie (n 6) 1320; YeeFen Lim (n 87) 21–3. 
135 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd [1961] AC 388.  
136 Mackie (n 6) 1324. 
137 Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121, 134 [24]–[25]. For the similar 
English and Singapore positions see O’Connor v The Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] 
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conventional MVA contexts to assist victims who had no information on the 
situation in the defendant’s vehicle. 138  Clarifying that AVs remain legally 
controlled by multiple parties means limb (c) does not a priori bar the doctrine’s 
application to AVs. 
This can be illustrated against the cases above. If, like in Umeda, there is direct 
evidence of an ADS failure, victims need not rely on the doctrine to establish 
breach. If there is no such evidence, there would be an ‘absence of explanation’. 
Next, it would be difficult for ADS manufacturer/developers to argue that an AV 
would ‘ordinarily’ drive straight into a highway median (Huang), a stalled vehicle 
(Nilsson), or plough into a group of motorcyclists (Umeda) without negligence — 
that may well be admitting that AVs are hazardous even when carefully designed 
and manufactured. Finally, assuming the ADS was not modified or poorly-
maintained post-sale, the risks which materialised to cause the accident — ADS 
malfunction — are arguably in the exclusive legal control of the 
manufacturer/developer. To be sure, the strength of this argument depends on 
specific case facts. Nonetheless, given the typical severity of AV accidents, 
standards-setting courts, which essentially balance the probability and severity of 
AV harm against precaution costs and activity utility,139 may be sympathetic to 
victim claims. 
On causation, algorithmic opacity precludes easy answers to whether, had General 
Motors or Tesla been more careful building the AVs, the above accidents would 
still have occurred. But tort law is not powerless in the face of scientific 
                                                 
EWCA Civ 1244, [58]–[59]; Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd 
[2018] 1 SLR 76, 90–1 [39] respectively. 
138 See, eg, Halliwell v Venables [1930] All ER Rep 284; Richley v Faull [1965] 3 All ER 109; Ooi 
Han Sun v Bee Hua Meng [1991] 1 SLR(R) 922. 
139 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47–8; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v 
Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 611–12 [190]–[192]. This approach has been codified in civil liability 




uncertainty,140 and in such situations courts have famously accepted alternative 
approaches to causation.141 Given the distributed nature of AV legal control, 
liability could be established, and perhaps apportioned, across multiple (careless) 
controllers based on material contribution to harm and/or risk.142 This, in turn, 
implicates legal causation, which involves policy considerations over whether legal 
responsibility should attach to the defendant’s conduct. 143  Since each AV 
stakeholder possesses a non-trivial amount of legal control, the question would 
probably not be whether that stakeholder can be held liable at all, but on how 
liability should be apportioned.144 
To illustrate, consider the similarities between Hudson and Muwafi and the 
textbook case of Wright v Lodge,145 where Lodge’s recklessly driven lorry collided 
with a broken-down car Shepherd negligently left on the highway. Lodge’s lorry 
spun out of control and crashed into opposing traffic, injuring one plaintiff and 
killing another. The court held that the injuries were wholly attributable to Lodge 
                                                 
140 This notably includes uncertainty over subsequent human conduct, as in Chester v Afshar [2005] 
1 AC 134. It follows that uncertainty over subsequent software conduct can equally be dealt with, 
though a detailed discussion falls beyond this article’s scope. 
141 For a review of the key cases and situations see generally Jane Stapleton, ‘Unnecessary Causes’ 
(2012) 129(1) Law Quarterly Review 39. Stapleton has argued for an extended causation test that 
accounts for ‘contribution[s] to an element of the positive requirements for the existence of the 
[harm]’: Jane Stapleton, ‘An “Extended But-For” Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of 
Obligations’ (2015) 35(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 697, 713. 
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190–5 [17]–[30]. 
143 Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 245 ALR 653, 687 [135]; Strong v Woolworths Ltd 
(n 140) 190–1 [18]–[19]. See also Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co [Nos 4 and 5] 
[2002] AC 883, 1091. 
144 This is in line with the private law trend towards apportionment, though a detailed examination 
falls beyond scope. See Kit Barker and Ross Grantham (eds), Apportionment in Private Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2019). 
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and not Shepherd, as Lodge’s reckless driving and speed were the primary reasons 
why the lorry violently swerved onto the opposing lane. Lodge, in other words, 
was primarily responsible for creating the actuated risks, and thus contributed 
most to the resulting harm. While the cases are not identical (Hudson was himself 
in the ‘lorry’, and Tesla’s ADS is now ‘Lodge’), determining who — amongst the 
manufacturer, developer, the ‘sleepy’ AV driver, and the victims themselves — 
had most control over the actuated risks would be equally pivotal. 
This article does not claim that control-centric analysis overcomes every obstacle 
with establishing negligence for AVs. Difficult legal questions remain, including 
what the standard of a reasonable AV manufacturer, developer, operator, or user 
should be. The point is merely that framing the AV liability question as one of 
distributed control over risks avoids the mistaken conclusion that tort law is ill-
equipped to deal with AVs. 
VI Conclusion 
This article demonstrates how the doctrine of control can illuminate analyses of 
AV negligence liability. Part II demonstrated how the ‘driver-centricity’ of 
existing liability regimes can, and should, be understood as the result of legal and 
moral control principles. Part III distinguishes between engineering and legal 
usages of ‘control’, emphasising that control in tort law relates primarily to the 
determination of metaphysical risks rather than physical behaviours. This is 
consistent with how courts have analysed control as a salient feature for 
establishing negligence duties, establishing Rylands as well as occupiers’ liability, 
and attributing third party liability. 
Against this backdrop, Part IV clarified that while AVs may be physically steered 
by software, legal persons across the AV supply and consumption chain, including 
manufacturers, developers, operators and consumers, nonetheless participate in 
the AV risk creation process and can thus be said to be in legal control of the 
same. Further, the elements of ML often present in ADS software do not 




illustrated how the tortious doctrine of control, properly understood, can assist 
courts with analysing negligence liability for such cases. Given the extent of legal 
control that manufacturers and developers have over AVs, including fully 
automated ones, establishing duty, breach, and causation for AV accidents may 
not be as problematic as initially apparent. The common law of torts, with its 
characteristic flexibility, may be better equipped to deal with AV accidents than 
initially apparent. 
